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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
AND
STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME 31 AUTUMN, 1956 NUMBER 3
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION
CORNE=US J. PECK*
On August 2, 1946, after nearly thirty years of Congressional con-
sideration, drafting, and redrafting, a. federal tort claims act of general
applicability was adopted.' In basic outline the act is simple.' It
subjects the United States to liability in the federal courts for money
damages" . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred."' From this general
acceptance of local state law as a measure of the government's liability'
* Associate Professor of Law, Umversity of Washington.1 The Federal Tort Claims Act was adopted as Title IV of the Legislative Reorgan-
ization Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 842. The statute was reenacted with some minor changes
in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code.
2 The basic provisions of the act are found in eleven sections of the Judicial Code,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (b), and 2671-80. A two-year period of limitations on tort claims is
established by 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) , trial by jury is denied by 28 U.S.C. § 2402; inter-
est and costs are governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2411 and 2412; and 28 U.S.C. J 1402 lays the
venue of tort claims actions in the distrct in which the plaintiff resides or wherein the
act or omission complained of occurred. Jurisdiction to review decisions of the district
courts is conferred by the general provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and an alternate, but
unused, appellate jurisdiction in tort claims cases is conferred on the court of claims by
28 U.S.C. §§ 1504 and 2110.
'The Government's contention that the determination of whether a member of the
military was acting in line of duty or in the scope of his employment should be deter-
mined by federal, and not local state law, was rejected in Williams v. United States,
350 U.S. 857 (1955), reversing per curiam 215 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1954). However,
the acceptance of a local law standard is not complete. As mentioned above, 28 U.S.C.§ 2401 (b) establishes an exclusive two year period of limitation on Federal Tort
Claims Act cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 prohibits assessment of interest prior to judgment
or punitive damages and allows instead actual or compensatory damages for wrongful
death in those states providing only punitive damages in such actions. The local conflict
of laws rule was not applied in United States v. Union Trust Company, 221 F2d 62
207
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a number of express exceptions from liability were made., Although
the wisdom or necessity of several of the express e:ceptions may be
questionable, only one of them-the discretionary function exception
-appears to have given rise to considerable confusion and litigation.
Other exceptions have been drawn by implication from the language
of the act and its relationship with other compensation legislation. For
example, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that since
the act may be invoked only on a "negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion" of an employee, liability does not arise by virtue of either United
States ownership of. an inherently dangerous commodity or property
or of engaging in an extra hazardous activity.6 Liability of the United
States to members of its military forces for personal injuries and
property damage has been the subject of a substantial amount of
litigation producing refined distinctions not found in the express lan-
guage of the act.! Some courts developed by implication another
exception from liability where the activity involved was considered
"governmental" and without an analogous private counterpart because
the statutory language imposes liability "... under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable.. ." But
this escape from liability has been closed, or at least strictly limited,
by the recent decision of the Supreme'Court in Indian Towing Com-
pany v. United States." Although the implied exceptions have uridoubt-
edly caused surprise to some litigants and a considerable amount of
(D.C.Cir. 1955),.cert. denied 350 U.S. 911 (1955). See also Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135 (1950). For a discussion of other areas in which the results of a suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act might differ from those in a local private action,
see Gottlieb, Stale Law Versu.r A Federal Common Law of Tort, 7 VAND. L. Rzy.
206 (1954).
5 Express exceptions other than the discretionary function exception include those
for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
Also expressly excepted are claims arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter; claims arising in respect of the assessment or
collection of any tax or customs duty; claims for which a remedy is provided by the
Suits in Admiralty Act or the Public Vessels Act; claims arising out of the adminis-
tration of The Trading With the Enemy Act; claims for damages caused by the
imposition or establishment of a quarantine; claims for damages caused by the fiscal
operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system; claims arising
out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces during time of war;
and claims arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority or the Panama
Canal Company. 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
6 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953). But ef. United States v.
Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953). cert. denied 347 U.S. 934 (1954).
7 See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949); Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135 (1950) ; United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); Archer v. United
States, 217 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 953; Preferred Insurance
Co. v. United States,-222 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 837.
8 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See also United States v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1955), aff'd, per curiam, 350 U.S. 907 (1955)."
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litigation, the difficulties which they have produced are small when
compared with those created by the express discretionary function
exception.
Indeed the vast amount of litigation concerning the discretionary
function exception has tended to obscure the fact that the act is one
which draws as much, if not more, of its content from tort law as from
the words of the statute. Able Government attorneys have an expert-
ness and familiarity with the. particular statute. From a natural
inclination to do battle on familiar grounds, they draw the combat
into an area where statutory construction, legislative history, and the
mysteries of governmental operations are of' prime importance, and
away from the orthodox principles of tort law with which private prac-
titioners are familiar. That the orthodox principles of law, without
the express statement of the exception, would preclude allowance by
the judiciary of claims which would obstruct normal governmental
operations or upset the traditional relationship of the judiciary with
the other branches of the Government appears certain when federal
cases involving the exception are compared with cases arising under
the New York Court of Claims Act, which contains a broad waiver
of immunity for torts without such an exception.' That misunder-
standing, resulting in injustice, has been the product of the express
exception is strongly suggested when other federal cases are compared
with New York cases.1" The confusion merges with surprise when one
is told that the exception was added "as a clarifying amendment" to
' Compare Barrett v. State of New York, 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917) with
Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616, (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 341 U.S. 939.
With respect to liability for failure to extinguish fires, compare Steitz v. City of
Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945) with Dalehite v. United States 346 U.S.
15 (1953) and Rayonier Incorporated v. United States 225 F2d 642 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. granted 351 U.S. 905. With respect to liability for failure to maintain signals
properly, compare Foley v. State, 294 N.Y. 275. 62 N.E2d 69 (1945) with Indian
Towing Company v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). As to Justice Frankfurter's
statement in the latter case that the Coast Guard need not undertake lighthouse service.
but is liable for negligence if it does so, compare Metildi v. State, 177 Misc. 179, 30
N.Y.S.2d 168 (Ct.Cls. N.Y, 1941). With respect to liability for failure to enforce laws
or make different laws, compare furrain v. Wilson Line, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 750, 70 App.
Div. 372, aff'd 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E. 2d 29 (1947), Young v. State, 278 App. Div.
997, 105 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1951), and Chastine v. State, 160 Misc. 828, 290 N.Y.S. 789(Ct. Cis. N.Y. 1936) with Dalehite v. United States, supra. With respect to the
liability of regulatory agencies, compare Toyos v. State, 181 Misc. 761, 47 N.Y.S.2d
322 (Ct. Cis. N.Y., 1944) with Schmidt v. United States, 198 F2d 32 (7th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied 344 U.S. 896. Compare also Goldstein v. State of New York, 281 N.Y.
396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939) with Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
10 Compare Weihs v. State, 267 App. Div. 233, 45 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1943) ; Joachim
v. State. 180 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.52d 167 (Ct. Cis. N.Y., 1943) with Smart Y. United
Sfates, 207 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Goodwill Industries of El Paso v. United States,
218 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1954) ; and Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D.
Ala. 1949). Compare also Williams v. State 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E2d 545 (1955),
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embrace cases that would have been exempted by judicial con-
struction."1
Nor has the effect of the exception been limited to cases arising
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The suggestion of such a defense
in the one act has been a sufficient reminder to ensure its being raised
in actions under previous, limited waivers of immunity for torts such
as the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act.2 The brief
for the Government in Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States,"
which was a suit under the Public Vessels Act decided before adoption
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, contained but two pages devoted to
the argument that public policy precluded the imposition of liability
under the Public Vessels Act for damage inflicted upon a vessel fol-
lowing directions given to it while in convoy during wartime. If the
case were to arise today, one may be assured that many pages would
be devoted to an argument that the naval vessel involved was engaged
in performance of a discretionary function. Nor would the argument
reversing a judgment against the state, not on a discretionary function theory, but on
a traditional, though perhaps incorrect, application of the risk theory of tort liability.
See RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 319 (1934).
One may be almost certain that a lengthy discussion of the discretionary function
exception would be necessary for disposition of a case against the federal government
such as Rosenweig v. State, 208 Misc. 1065, 146 N.Y.S. 2d 589 (Ct. Cims. N.Y., 1955)
(State liable for the death 6f a boxer who, through the negligence of the examining
doctors, was permitted to fight again after having been the victim of two technical
knock-outs within the preceding five weeks).
11 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26-27 (1953).
The most frequently quoted excerpt from the legislative history of the exception is
a paragraph which was repeated time and again in the reports on tort claims legisla-
tion from the time of the insertion of the exception in the bills under consideration.
See H. R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess, 10 (1942); S. REP. No. 1196, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess, 7 (1942); H. R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong, 1st Sess., 5-6 (1945);
Hearings Before House Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.,
p. 33 (1942). The paragraph reads as follows:
"Section 402 specifies the claims which would not be covered by the bill. The first
subsection of section 402 exempts from the bill claims based upon the performance or
nonperformance of discretionary functions or duties on the part of a Federal agency or
Government employee, whether or not the discretion involved be abused, and claims
based upon the act or omission of a Government employee exercising due care in the
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not valid. This is a highly important
exception, intended to preclude any possibility that the bill might be construed to
authorize suit for damages against the Government growing out of an authorized
activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project, where no negligence on the part of
any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention that the
same conduct by a private individual would be tortious, or that the statute or regulation
authorizing the project was invalid. It is also designed to preclude application of the bill
to a claim against a regulatory agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the
Securities and Exchange Commission, based upon an alleged abuse of discretionary
authority by an officer or employee, whether or not negligence is alleged to have been
involved. To take another example, claims based upon an allegedly negligent exercise by
the Treasury Department of the blacklisting or freezing powers are also intended to be
excepted. The bill is not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the validity "of
or provide a remedy on account of such discretionary acts even though negligently per-
formed and involving an abuse of discretion. Nor is it desirable or intended that the
[Au~uxx
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go unmentioned in the opinion of the Court. An argument that the
failure to mark or remove a sunken government owned vessel was
only a failure to perform a governmental duty and not such a failure
as gave rise to liability received only passing mention in the decision
of Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States." Today, dressed in
the language of discretionary function, it would provide one of the
major bases for decision. A claim for the loss of cocoa beans during,
time of war caused by the overturning of a barge upon removal of
the beans to make warehouse space for incoming military stores and
provide ballast for departing vessels was decided upon the basis of
the ordinary rules applicable to carriers." Today one might be sure
that the discretionary function exception would play an important
part in determining liabilities. To be sure, arguments akin to the dis-
cretionary function exception arguments of the Government are implicit
in statutes waiving governmental immunity in suits for torts. But the
vast amount of litigation suggests that the amendment by which the
exceptiop was added did not achieve its purpose of clarifying the
law, and, as suggested above, the variation in the results of litigation
suggests that with the confusion injustice has come.1 '
The purpose of this article is a limited one. It contains no sugges-
tions for a broad statutory scheme for distributing all the burdens
and costs of government. Its purpose is to suggest no more than a
workable and just construction for the discretionary function excep-
tion of the statute. For the greatest part, the suggestion is no more
than what the legislative history of the exception suggests-that the
courts take note of the special problems of determining the liability
constitutionality of legislation, or the legality of a rule or regulation should be tested
through the medium of a damage suit for tort. However, the common-law torts of
employees of regulatory agencies would be included within the scope of the bill to the
same extent as torts of nonregulatory agencies. Thus, section 402 (5) and (10),
exempting claims arising from the administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act
or the fiscal operations of the Treasury, are not intended to exclude such common-law
torts as an automobile collision caused by the negligence of an employee of the Treasury
Department or other Federal agency administering those functions."
12 See, e.g., P. Dougherty Co. v. United States, 207 F.2d 626 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert.
denied 347 U.S. 912; Carr v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Va. 1955). Similar
arguments had been successfully made, however, prior to adoption of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, in suits brought against the T.V.A. Lynn v. United States, 110 F.2d
586 (5th Cir. 1940); Posey v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 93 F.2d 726 (5th COr.
1937) ; and in a suit against the Home Owners Loan Corporation, Adamo v. H.O.L.C,
107 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1939).I1324 U.S. 215, (1945). See the Government's brief, pp. 20-22.
14 272 U.S. 675, (1927).
15 0. F. Nelson & C. Ltd. v. United States, 149 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1945).
1Compare, for example, Denny v. United States, 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied 337 U.S. 919 with Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950)
and United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952).
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of the Government for torts and then proceed to decide the cases as
they would have done if the exception were not present in the act.
They will not be without guides if they do so. Historical analogies from
the fields of mandamus actions and private damage suits against gov-
ernment officials, if analyzed in light of the reasons for the decisions,
give some aid. More important, the principles of ordinary tort law
supply answers to the liability of the Government under the act.
First, however, it seems appropriate to turn to the language of the
act and the leading cases decided under it.
THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEADiNG CASES
The discretionary function exception is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680
(a) as a part of a bifurcated exception from liability. The language of
the exception is that the act shall not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
The first portion of the exception-that relating to acts or omissions
in the execution of a itatute or regulation-is susceptible of under-
standing without great difficulty and has caused little litigation. But
it should be noted, for the meaning it gives to the balance of the
exception, that to be applicable, the exception requires that the em-
ployee have been exercising due care in the execution of the statute or
regulation. In short, the exception precludes a test of the validity of
a statute or regulation through the means of a tort action, but it will
not bar recovery for acts or omissions of an employee which are other-
wise negligent or wrongful."
Difficulty with the second portion of the exception-the portion re-
lating to exercise or performance of a discretionary function--becomes
apparent almost immediately. It is an obvious proposition that most
claims for damages caused by negligent acts are based upon the abuse
of discretion, either in the exercise or the failure to exercise discretion.
For example, the mail truck driver hurrying to get a load of mail on
a departing train exercises some discretion in deciding whether to make
a left turn before oncoming traffic or to wait until that traffic has
passed. Just as obvious is the proposition that such discretionary
17 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
[Au ,.,x
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determinations must not be excluded if the act is to have any effect.
The difficulty created by the conflict of these two obvious propositions
grows as the nature of the discretionary decision changes, and a search
for a meaning other than the usual dictionary definitions of "discre-
tionary" becomes imperative.
Until the 1955 term of the Supreme Court the leading case on the
meaning of. the discretionary function exception was Dalehite v. United
States,"s a test case for the many claims growing out of the explosion
at Texas City, Texas, of fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate which had
been manufactured for the United States. In -pposing the grant of
certiorari in that case, the Government admitted the general importance
of determining the scope of the discretionary function exception but
argued, "The present case, however, does not present an appropriate
factual context for a definitive decision in this twilight zone, even if
the failure of proof (of negligence) is not regarded as decisive,
because petitioners charged the whole Government as such with negli-
gence, and did not focus their pleadings or proof upon any particular
negligent acts or omission."'" The number of claimants and the
amount of damages involved probably made the case of sufficient
importance to justify review by certiorari, but the force of the Govern-
ment's argument against granting the writ emerges again in the state-
ment in the majority opinion that "It is unnecessary to define, apart
from this case, precisely where discretion ends."" Indeed, as wil be
suggested later, it appears that the Government may have won a
broader defensive position in that case than it attempted to establish.
The facts of the Dalehite case were as follows: at the end of World
War II the obligations of the United States as an occupying power and
the dangers of international unrest made it necessary for the govern-
ment to formulate plans for feeding the populations of occupied
countries. Shipment of fertilizers had an obvious advantage over the
direct shipment of food. Following cabinet approval of the plan,
deactivated ordnance plants were put into operation on contracts with
private concerns for the manufacture of fertilizer grade ammonium
nitrate under detailed specifications provided by the Field Director of
Ammunition Plants. The Field Director acted under authority dele-
gated to him by the Army's Chief of Ordnance, on whom responsibility
for carrying out the plan had been placed. The specifications provided
8346 U.S. 15 (1953).
VI Brief in Opposition to the petition for certiorari, p. 11, Dalehite v. United States,
supra, note 1&
so 346 U.S. at 3S.
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for the private concerns were drawn up in light of prior experience of
private concerns and the TVA. They established such details as a
bagging temperature of the fertilizer at 2000 F.; the type of moisture-
proof paper bagging; the labeling of the bags; and a coating material
of paraffin, rosin and petrolatum for the grains of fertilizer. Each of
these specifications was of importance in the case because fertilizer
grade ammonium nitrate is an oxidizing material which gives off oxygen
to support combustion in carbonaceous material when heated. The
fertilizer did not cool when shipped, but continued at high temperatures
to the point where it was loaded on ships.
The particular fertilizer involved in the Texas City explosion was
loaded on a vessel carrying a substantial cargo of explosives. When
a fire occurred in the fertilizer in the hold of the vessel, attempts to put
it out by closing the hatches and introducing steam were, of course,
unsuccessful. A terrific explosion occurred, leveling much of the city
and killing many people. Fire spread to another vessel likewise loaded
with fertilizer. Attempts to tow that vessel to sea were unsuccessful,
and a second devastating explosion occurred. Former experience had
not revealed this explosive quality of fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate,
but the experimental tests of the fertilizer conducted by the govern-
ment had not exhausted the possibilities of discovering this quality.
In a four to three decision the Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals decision, which reversed the District Court's judgment
against the Government. The Supreme Court held that the discretion-
ary function exception barred recovery. The majority of the Court
said:'
It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where dis-
cretion ends. It is enough to hold, as we do, that the "discretionary
function or duty" that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort
Claims Act -includes more than the initiation of programs and activities.
It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where
there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It
necessarily follows that the acts of subordinates in carrying out the
operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot
be actionable. If it were not so, the protection of § 2680 (a) would
fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when a subordinate performs
or fails to perform a causal step, each action or nonaction being directed
by the superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion. (emphasis
supplied.)
2' 346 U.S. at 35-36.
[Aurumx
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Of the decisions to establish each of the specifications mentioned above,
the majority said "... the considerations that dictated the decisions
were crucial ones, involving the feasibility of the program itself.. ,"
that "... they were the product of an exercise of judgment, requiring
consideration of a vast spectrum of factors, including some which
touched directly the feasibility of the fertilizer program . " The
decision to label the bags only as "oxidizing material" was dictated by
the pertinent ICC regulations, and those regulations were immune from
attack under the first phrase of §2680 (a)." The District Court's
findings of negligence in the failure to prevent the fire by regulating
storage or loading of the fertilizer in some different fashion fell class-
ically within the exception of discretionary governmental decisions.
Likewise, the alleged failure of the Coast Guard in fighting the fire
would not result in liability because the act did not create new causes
of action where none existed before, nor did it change the rule that an
alleged failure or carelessness of public firemen does not create private
actionable rights."
The three dissenting justices were of the opinion that the duty of
further inquiry and negligence in shipment and failure to warn were
sufficient to support the District Court's judgment against the Govern-
ment. They would not have based liability on any decision taken at
cabinet level; their view was that a policy adopted in the exercise of
an immune discretion was carried out carelessly by those in charge
of detail. While recognizing immunity in" the area in which an official
exerts governmental authority in a manner which legally binds one or
many, they viewed the execution of the fertilizer program as indis-
tinguishable from activities performed by private individuals. Though
the official decisions involved required a nice balancing of various
considerations it wa , they believed, the kind of balancing which cit-
izens do'at their peril, and hence not within the exception of the statute.
That the majority opinion gave a broader defensive effect to the
discretionary function exception than the Government attempted to
establish is suggested by comparison of portions of the majority
opinion with the argument of the Government's brief. As set out above,
the majority said, "Where there is room for policy judgment and deci-
sion there is discretion." The Government's brief said, "We do not
urge that every act or omission in the course of fulfilling a discretionary
program is automatically excluded from coverage because the initial
22 346 U.S. at 40.
21 346 US. at 42.
2 346 US. at 43.
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establishment of the program was discretionary...; on the contrary,
our position is that every act or omission which we claim to be covered
by the 'discretionary' exception must involve, in itself and not merely
by parentage or affiliation, a discretionary function."" Elsewhere in
its brief the Government argued that the planning and execution of the
fertilizer program had to be based on evaluation of governmental
interests such as the speed with which the fertilizer hgad to be produced
in order to safeguard our troops and avoid further outbreaks of
hostilities;2" that an important factor in the determination to accept
the existing specifications and practices for manufacture was the gov-
ernmental interest in obtaining as rapidly as possible fertilizer for
war-torn regions;2" and that each of the decisions as to bagging temper-
ature, the coating material, the use of paper bags, and the shipping
notices involved complex value judgments based upon special govern-
mental needs. Indeed, the matter of reducing the bagging temperature
was specifically reconsidered and the suggestion rejected because,
among other things, it would have resulted in a substantial loss of
necessary production."
Each of these matters does appear in the majority opinion, and the
majority did say, "The decisions held culpable were all responsibly
made .at a planning rather than operational level and involved consid-
erations more or less important to the practicability of the Govern-
ment's fertilizer program."' But nowhere does the majority state, as
the Government had argued, that each decision was based upon a
determination that the course of conduct pursued was necessary or
desirable for achievement of the objectives of the Government's ferti-
lizer program. The majority opinion says that " ... having manufactured
and shipped the commodity FGAN for more than three years without
even minor accidents, the need for further experimentation was a
mattr of discretion,"'0 not that the discretion involved in determining
that immediate production of fertilizer without further experimentation
was necessary for achievement of the governmental objectives pre-
cluded imposition of liability on the basis of the decision to adopt
existing practices. The majority opinion says that the decision to keep
the product in the graining kettles for a longer period or to install
cooling equipment would result in greatly increased production costs
25 Brief for the United States, p. 177, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)
26M., p. 214.
2T Id., pp. 218-219.
281d. 222, 223, 2245.
'. 346 U.S. at 42.
so0346 U.S. at X8
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and/or greatly reduced production, and was not a decision which
courts were empowered to cite as negligence; 8* not that the need for
immediate quantity production of fertilizer to achieve the governmental
objectives of the program made discretionary the determination to bag
the fertilizer at the higher temperature. When coupled with its state-
ment that where there is room for policy judgment and decision there
is discretion, the statements in the majority opinion are susceptible of
an interpretation which gives immunity where governmental policy
decisions might have been, but in fact were not, the cause of the harm
for which suit is brought. In short, it suggests that a negligent over-
sight, unconnected with governmental policy or objectives, would not
give rise to liability because it was committed in the area where
discretion might have been, but in fact was not, involved.
If this were all that the Supreme Court had said on the subject,
suggestion of a different construction of the discretionary function
exception might constitute little more than a futile exercise in
statutory interpretation. But two more tort claims cases came
before the Supreme Court in the 1955 term. Though the decisions
say little directly about the discretionary function exception, they are
reminders of the limited nature of the Dalehite definition of the
exception and suggest that, through interpretation in an area left open
by the Dalehite decision, an interpretation of the.exception different
from that suggested by the decision may eventually result. Those cases
are Indian Towing Company v. United States2 and United States v.
Union Trust Company.""
The Indian Towing case involved a claim for the loss of a cargo
which occurred when a tug ran aground, allegedly because of the
negligence of the Coast Guard in the inspection and repair of an
unwatched lighthouse light and in failing to give warning that the
light was not operating. The Government did not base its defense on
the discretionary function exception. It conceded that the question
81346 U.S. at 40-41.
82350 U.S. 61 (1955).
23350 U.S. 907 (1955). For those who find significance in such things it may be
interesting to note that the Dalehite case was decided by a four to three majority, with
Justices Clark and Douglas not participating. In the Indian Towing Company case,
Justice Douglas joined those who had dissented in the Dalehite case, while Justice
Clark joined those who had constituted the majority in that case. However, the late
Chief Justice Vinson, who had voted with the majority in the Dalehite case, was
replaced by Chief Justice Warren, who joined with the dissenters of the Dalehite
in deciding the Indian Tow case. The late Justice Jackson, who had written the dissent
in the Dalehite case was replaced by Justice Harlan, who also joined the former
dissenters. In effect, the majority deciding the Indian Towing Company case consisted
of tho-e who had dissented in the Dalehite case plus new members of the court and
one member who had not participated in the decision of the earlier case.
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involved was one of liability at a level susceptible of characterization
as the "operational level"-a phrase appearing in the majority Dalehite
opinion-and that the exception was not involved. Instead, the Govern-
ment sought to establish another defense suggested by the language of
the act, the decision in Peres v. United.States,," and certain portions
of the Dalehite opinion: that there could be no liability under the
act because the activity involved was uniquely governmental and
without a private counterpart from which a standard of conduct and
liability could be drawn. This was rejected by a majority of the
Court. They believed the liability of a volunteer or "good Samaritan"
of general tort law to be a sufficiently persuasive analogy.
Although the Government conceded in the Indian Towing case that
the discretionary function exception was not applicable, no such con-
cession was made in the Union Trust Company case.'" But the Supreme
Court affirmed a judgment against the United States in a per curiam
opinion, citing only the Indian Towing decision. In the Union Trust
Company case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had
affirmed a judgment against the United States for the wrongful
deaths of passengers on an Eastern Airlines plane which crashed
while landing at Washington National Airport when it was struck by
a P-38 military plane piloted by a Bolivian pilot." The basis of
imposing liability on the Government was the negligence of an employee
of the Civil Aeronautics Administration in the control tower at the
airport. His negligence consisted of failing to issue a timely warning
to the Eastern plane that the P-38 was also on a final approach to the
airport; in failing to warn the P-38 pilot that the Eastern plane was
likewise on a final approach; in clearing both planes for landing on the
same runway at approximately the same time; and in failing to keep
each of the planes advised of the activities of the other. These
specifications of negligence are certainly susceptible of the character-
ization given them by the Court of Appeals as acts and failures to act
at the "operational level." If the characterization is accepted, the
acts on which liability was based fall within the area of the Govern-
"4340 U.S. 135 (1950).
"5 The petition for certiorari filed by the Government in the Union Trust Company
case stated as one of the questions presented: "Whether the discretionary function
exception of that Act (28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a)) bars claims arising from the discretionary
acts of federal employees at 'the operational level' as well as acts at the policy-forming
level." The Supreme Court took the unusual action of granting the petition and
affirming on the basis of the briefs then filed.
86 Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), af'd
350 U.S. 907.
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ment's concession in the Indian Towing case and an area marked out by
indirection in the Dalehite case."
Acceptance of classifications based on the level of the discretionary
activities involved would provide a terminology with a superficial
appeal. It would, however, do little to solve the problem of what is an
exempt discretionary function. Indeed, the distinction between activ-
ities at the "operational level" and those at the "planning level" is
susceptible of no greater precision in definition than the distinction
between actiVities which are "governmental" and those which are
"non-governmental" or "proprietary"-a distinction which the re-
alligned majority in the Indian Towing case einphatically rejected as a
quagmire of municipal law, based on casuistries and requiring the
reconciliation of the irreconcilable."' It would be surprising if that same
majority intended to accept a vague classification of levels of activities
as a basis for rejecting the Government's argument that the discretion-
ary function exception applied in the Union Trust Company case." If
they did, they furnished no criteria for determining what is activity at
the operational level, and none had been previously given.
Not only would acceptance of such a classification involve all the
'
T In the Dalehite decision the majority made this statement, quoted above: "The
decisions held culpable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational
level and involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the
Government's fertilizer program." (emphasis supplied). 346 U.S. at 42. That this
conclusionary statement was not intended to establish the criteria for determining
applicability of the exception is indicated by the statement made a few pages earlier
that, "It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where discretion
ends." 346 U.S. at 35. If the majority in the Dalehite case had intended to establish
such a test of liability, more than a passing mention of the term would probably have
appeared in the opinion. The majority opinion appears to have been directed more
toward determining where discretion lay than toward establishing a distinction between
the operational and the planning levels of governmental activity. Nevertheless, the
distinction has been accepted by some of the lower courts as determinative. See, e.g,
Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955) aff'd 350 U.S. 907,
Sullivan v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill 1955).
88350 U.S. at 65.
,9Though the per curiam opinion does not so state, it is possible that the grant of
certiorari was intended for review of only the first question presented by the govern-
ment: whether operation of a control tower at an airport is a uniquely governmental
function, without a private counterpart, and hence excluded from the area of liability
by the language of the act authorizing suits ".. where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant.. ." This, of course, was the only comparable
question decided in the Indian Towing Company case, unless a concession made in
one case becomes the law for future cases.
The explanation advanced by the Government for its concession in the one case and
its insistence on the applicability of the exception in the other was that, unlike the
duties of the Coast Guard in the Indian Towing Company case, control tower operators
had a duty not only to warn, but to regulate and control aircraft in flight. Gov. Pet. for
Cert., p. 20. Thus control tower operators performed activities more analogous to
police or regulatory work involving governmental discretion. Id., pp. 32-35. Though
the distinction may not have great appeal, it is certainly not one which should be
rejected without explanation.
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difficulties inherent in a formula for determining liability stated in
terms only vaguely definable, but it would also present a scheme for
disposition of cases which would have none of the appearance of
justice. One may ponder at length what is the difference, other than the
rank and pay of the employee involved, between a decision to bag an
oxidizing material at high temperature and a decision to allow two
airplanes to approach an airport runway at approximately the same
time-why one is "operational" and the other "planning"--unless it be
that one decision was deliberately made upon consideration that the
choice was required for the furtherance of a governmental program
whereas the other, if not made through oversight and without consider-
ation of the objectives of the governmental program, at least bore
but slight relationship to it. To phrase the test of liability in terms
which leave out its essential component would result in both confusion
and dissatisfaction.
For example, this problem could arise in a case such as the Indian
Towing case. Suppose the only negligence established by the plaintiff
is the infrequency of inspection. Suppose further that the government
shows that, after explanation of its operating procedures and possible
alternatives upon presentation of its requests for funds to Congress,
the Coast Guard received appropriations which required some curtail-
ment of operations; that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, after
consideration of the alternatives among others of reducing the number
of unwatched lights or the scheduling of less frequent inspections,
deliberately followed his previously stated preference for the latter; and
that the light involved was in fact inspected in accordance with the
schedule thus established. Surely the characterization of frequency of
inspection as a matter at the "operational level" would no longer be
appropriate." And just as certainly, provided the Government's proof
of the matters listed above was firm and convincing, to permit recovery
would allow a private citizen to challenge and overturn a Congressional
determination of the amount of money which should be appropriated
for Coast Guard purposes and the decision of an authorized officer
40 Cf. Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (D.N.D. 1950), cited with approval
by the majority in the Dalehite decision, 346 U.S. at 37, holding the discretionary
function exception applicable to a claim for damages to property caused when employees
of the Fish and Wildlife Service opened the dam, releasing large quantities of flood
waters into a river channel blocked with ice. Though it may have been improper to
dismiss the complaint without proof that the waters were released pursuant to the
authority of someone authorized to determine that such action was necessary to achieve
the purposes for which the dam was erected, the case is a reminder that the nature of
some governmental operations requires that a large portion of the discretion involved
be exercised by employees at the "operational level."
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as to how the money appropriated should be spent. If the discretionary
function exception has any meaning, it must encompass determinations
of this kind.
GumEs To A PRoPER CONSTRUCTION
Some guides to a proper construction of the discretionary function
exception can be found in the law and cases antedating the Tort
Claims Act. Two lines of cases-mandamus actions and private damage
suits against public officers-provide the most persuasive analogies
because they so intimately involve the relatiopship between the judici-
ary and the other branches of government. This, of course, is in broad
terms the problem of the discretionary function exception. But, as in
other situations,' the adoption of the Tort Claims Act has itself
changed the weights and forces on the balancing scales, and an
unchanged incorporation of terminology or tests developed in other
contexts is unlikely to provide a rationale for the exception or to serve
the purposes of the act. Nevertheless, these historical analogies are of
considerable assistance in determining the meaning of the exception.
For example, reference to mandamus actions would discredit a
distinction between actions taken at the "planning level" and actions
taken at the "operational level." Since the decision in Marbury v.
Madison2 it has been established in this country that mandamus will
not issue to control executive discretion in matters which are political
or by the Constitution and laws of the United States committed to the
official for discretionary action. But that decision also established
the proposition, not since repudiated, that "It is not by the office of the
person to whom the wxit is directed but the nature of the thing to be
done, that the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus is to
be determined.""
Likewise, the blanket immunity suggested by the Dalehite decision
finds no support in mandamus actions against public officials. Manda-
mus is not refused merely because the official might have made his
decision upon the basis of discretionary powers vested in him. That
is, it is no defense on the part of a public official to a petition for
writ of mandamus to answer merely that the area involved is one in
41 Cf. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). Cf. also Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Corp, 337 U.S. 682, at 686-688 (1949, refusing to accept the
immunity or liability of public officers in private damage suits as determinative of when
cquitab'e actions to enjoin public officers may be maintained.
421 Cranch 137 (1803).
4 1 Cranch at 170-171.
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which he might have exercised discretion. He must go further and
prove either that the decision he maae was made in the exercise of
discretionary powers given him," or that, in the exercise of the discre-
tion given him, he decided to take no action."' If the area of discretion
is clear, proof usually need be no more than his statement. But there
must be proof that discretion was involved. Several cases even go
so far as to allow mandamus to compel the -re-exercise of discretion
where the original determination was made upon a mistake or
misapprehension as to the effect of a law.?
Acceptance of the analogy with the limitations of the immunity
recognized in the mandamus field would render the discretionary
function exception inapplicable to acts or omissions which might
have been directed in the exercise of discretion if in fact they were
not. It would also reconcile the results of the Dalehite, Indian Towing,
and Union Trust Company cases. The former involved affirmative,
discretionary determinations as to what should be done and what
risks would be encountered to achieve certain governmental objectives;
the latter two did not.
The other historical analogy which deserves detailed consideration
is the immunity of public officials from private actions for damages
caused by the performance of authorized acts involving the exercise
of discretion. AcceptAnce of the analogy by the majority in the Dalehite
case is indicated by the citation of Spaulding v. Vilas'T and Alzua v.
Johnson?'. The dissenters also recognized that official discretionary
activities should be controlled solely by the statutory or administrative
mandate and not by the added threat of private damage suits." The
principle has been applied to accord immunity to official discretionary
acts of not only judges"' and cabinet officers 5 but to the Comptroller
"4 Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters 524, 37 U.S. 429 (1838) ; Roberts v. United
States, 176 U.S. 221 (1900) ; Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917).
45 New York Life and Fire Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 33 U.S. 291, at 303, 8 Peters
291, at 303 (1834) ; see Commissioner of Patents v. Whiteley, 71 U.S. 522, at 534, 4
Wallace 290 (1866); Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206 at 218 (1930).
46 Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942) ; Louisville Cement Co. v. I.C.C., 246 U.S.
638 (1918); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U.S.
474 (1911); Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277 (1895). A similar review of the discre-
tionary decisions of government employees in suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act
is probably precluded by the phrase in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) "... whether or not the
discretion involved be abused." But cases such as Ex parte Kawato, supra, support
the suggestion made infra, that the discretionary function exception is no bar to
recovery for acts or omissions might have been directed in the exercise of discretion
if they in fact were not.
'47 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
45 231 U.S. 106 (1913).
" 346 U.S. at 59.
50 Alzua v. Johnson, supra, n. 48.
&'Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 44 U.S. 87 (1845) ; Spalding v. Vilas, xufta, note
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of the Currency," members of the.Securities Exchange Commission,"
a member of the Federal Parole Board," Selective Service Board
officials,"5 local United States Attorneys and assistants,' and a number
of other subordinate officials." The principle affords immunity even
though the official acts maliciously, and, in what is frequently taken as
the most authoritative statement of the principle,"' Judge Learned-
Hand held that the immunity exists, not only where the official acts
for the public good, but where the occasion would have justified the
act, if he had been using his power for any of the purposes for which
it was vested in him."
The broad immunity thus granted is frankly based on a balance
of the evils inherent in the alternatives presented.60 To accord immunity
denies compensation to one who has been injured and leaves the
correction and punishment of truant officials to his administrative
superiors, who may lack the zeal or interest to see that justice is done.
To deny immunity exposes the official to review in court of each' of
his actions and subjects him to a possible personal liability if he decides
incorrectly; it would thus encourage official timidity and discourage
free and fearless discharge of duties; and it would render public offices
undesirable positions. If claims could be restricted to those where
the official acted maliciously or for other than official purposes, the
immunity would cease at that point, but the nature of disappointed
litigants is such that all official action would be subjected to the test of
a trial. Upon a balance, the public interest seems better served by
granting the complete immunity.
Complete acceptance of the analogy would support the blanket
immunity suggested by the Dalehite decision. But, the enactment of
the Federal Tort Claims Act itself has made the analogy inexact. The
47; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1934), cert. denied
293 U.S. 605; Glass v. Ickes, 117 F2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied 311 U.S. 718;
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 949.
82 Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied 305 U.S. 643.
5s Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1941) cert. denied 314 U.S. 665.
:" Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert.'denied 302 U.S. 686.
5 Gibson v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 337 U.S. 925;
Dodez v. Weygandt, 173 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1949).
"6 Cooper v. O'Connor, sura, note 52; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926),
aff'd, 275 U.S. 503.
57 Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 341 U.S.
921. And see the many authorities discussed in the cases cited notes 51-56 supra.5" Gregoire v. Biddle, supMr, note 51.
"9 177 F.2d at 581.
"0 Gregoire v. Biddle, supra, 177 F2d at 581; Papagianakis v. The Samos, supra, 186
F.2d at 260; Cooper v. O'Connor, supra, 99 F.2d at 137; Gibson v. Reynolds, JUpra, 172
F2d at 97. See James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 22 U. o, Cm. L Rzv.
610 at 647 (1955).
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balance struck in the private damage actions is inconsistent with the
newly adopted policy of comlpensating persons injured by governmental
operations. Though court should not review or revise discretionary
decisions actually 'made by authorized officials, most of the reasons
which gave rise to the broader immunity given individual officers have
no application in suits against the Government under the act. The
act specifically provides that a judgment in a suit against the Govern-
ment shall be a complete bar to any action by the claimant on the same
subject matter against any employee of the Government.6' Nor is the
employee liable indirectly by way of a suit for indemnity for his
wrongful acts which have imposed liability on the Government. 2 Thus,
there have been removed from the scales important factors which led
to according the immunity-the undesirability of public office and the
timidity and lack of bold and fearless action which would be induced
by a possible personal liability."
It is true that removal in Tort Act cases of that portion of the
immunity covering situations which might have been, but in fact were
not, occasions of action for official purposes might have some of the
undesirable effects which gave rise to the immunity in private damage
actions. For example, a tort action against the Government might
disclose otherwise hidden errors or mistakes of an official to the public
and his administrative superiors, and the possibility of this might
induce timidity of action. But the display of such errors and mistakes
is not entirely unwholesome. Trial of issues in the area in which
discretion might have been exercised would, of course, take the time
of, and accordingly burden, overworked officials. But against this, the
policy of compensating citizens for. wrongs done by Government
employees certainly weighs heavier than it did on the days of complete
sovereign immunity for wrongful acts."
6128 U.S.C. § 2676.
82 United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
63 See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U.S. at 495-496; Gregoire v. Biddle, supro,
177 F.2d at 581. See James, op. cit. supra, note 60, at pp. 652-653; Note, 66 HA~v. L.
Rav. 488, at 495-496 (1953).
64 If liability of the United States exists only "on a 'negligent or wrongful act or
omission' of an employee," see 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b), see also Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. at 44, it is arguable as a matter of statutory construction that the United
States is not liable if the employees committing the act or omission are immune from
liability. Some courts have indicated that liability on the part of the employees is a
necessary element of liability on the part of the Government. In re Texas City Disaster
Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, at 776 (5th Cir. 1952), affd sub norm. Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15; Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949);
See the opinion of judge Woodrough in National Manufacturing Co. v. United States,
210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 347 U.S. 967.
However, Chief Judge Magruder of the First Circuit expressed the opinion that
[-Aurumx
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TIlE PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION
An exception from a waiver of sovereign immunity rai.ses problems
of the burden of proof. If a strict construction is applied to the statute
waiving immunity, a party seeking to bring his case within the statute
may be required to rebut the applicability of any of its exceptions.
Though the results in particular cases may leave some doubts, a liberal
construction is said to be appropriate for the Federal Tort Claims
Act."5 If the application of liberal construction is to have any meaning,
it would seem that the discretionary function exception should not be
considered jurisdictional in the sense that, a plaintiff is required to
rebut or disprove the presence of discretionary action or determinations
in the matters upon which he bases his complaint. The historical
analogies, particularly mandamus actions, support such treatment of
the exception. Moreover, consideration of the problems of proving
an affirmative as opposed to a negative and the availability of evidence
as between the parties suggests that the proper treatment of the
exception is to require the government to prove its applicability. Those
cases specifically considering whether the exception presents a question
of jurisdiction or defense support the treatment of it as a defensive
matter."
The proof required of the Government to establish the defense
should be that the acts and omissions of which the plaintiff complains
were specifically directed, or risks knowingly, deliberately, or neces-
sarily encountered, by one authorized to do so, for the advancement of a
governmental objective and pursuant to discretionary authority given
liability on the part of an employee was not an essential element of liability on the part
of the Government. United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 1952). And the
Government's position before the Supreme Court in the Dalehite case was simply that
had to be a showing of negligent or wrongful conduct by an employee, regardless of
whether the individual employee would be suable himself. Brief for the United States, p.
177. Though the general scheme of the act is one of imposing liability on a respondeat
superior basis, no reason exists to demand absolute symmetry in this respect. As Judge
Magruder pointed out, some courts have imposed liability on a respondeat superior
basis where the employee involved would have had an immunity to such an action.
In United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954), the Supreme Court held the
Government had no action of indemnity against an employee whose wrongful acts
subjected it to liability. If such a common element of an employer-employee relationship
is denied because of the special relationship between the Government and its employees,
it would seem that even if liability on the part of an employee is required in suits
between private parties for imposition of liability on the employer, the special relation-
ship between the Government and its employees, as well as the purposes of the act,
would justify a deviation from that general rule.
65 See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, at 554-555 (1951).
61 Air Transport Associates v. United States, 221 F2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Stewart
v. United States, 199 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1952). Cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 at 140-141. Cf. also Jackson v. Irving Trust Co, 311 U.S. 494 (1940). But Cf. also
Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36 (1938); Phalen v. United States, 32 F.2d 687(2d Cir. 1929).
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him by the Constitution, a statute, or-regulation-that is, authority to
make a decision that the act, omission, or risk involved was one which it
was necessary or desirable to perform or encounter in order to achieve
the objectives or purposes for which he was given authority. So long as
the act or omission is one which a Government eniployee was authorized
to direct, and did direct, it is within the exception; so long as the risk
involved is one which he was authorized to encounter in furtherance of
the governmental objective, and did, it forms a necessary part of the
discretionary function. It makes no difference, if the matter was within
the employee's authority, that a judge would have decided to do other-
wise, because the exception applies ".... whether or not the discretion
involved be abused." But where there is no authority to make such a
decision in furtherance of a governmental objective-such as the mail
truck driver's decision to further a policy of expediting the mails-the
exception does not apply. Even where there might have been authority
-as in failing to give warnings of an atomic bomb test for purposes of
national security"7 or establishing a schedule of infrequent inspection of
lighthouses as a deliberate choice between fewer lighthouses or fewer
inspections'--if it was not in fact exercised, the act or omission would
not be within the exception.
It cannot be denied that a tremendous burden of proof will thus be
imposed on the Government. The burden is somewhat reduced by the
fact that it will be. important only in cases where other express excep-
tions are not applicable." Nor can it be denied that the courts will be
forced to review some executive decisions where it is claimed that
certain acts or omissions were considered necessary to achievement of
governmental objectives for the accomplishment of which authority was
conferred on the employee so deciding or directing. However, the
review will be limited to determinations of whether, as a matter of fact
substantiated by the evidence, discretion was exercised, or whether the
problem is such that without consideration of evidence it is apparent
that the acts or omissions on which the complaint is based necessarily
received consideration and played a part in a discretionary decision.
The same is true in the mandamus field, where not every claim that the
action involved was discretionary is recognized." Indeed, it must occur
under aimost any construction in any case in which the exception is held
'
7 Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955).
6 Cf. Indian Towing Company v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
'9 See note 5, supra.
70 Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917) ; Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221
(1900); Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters 524, 37 U.S. 429 (1838).
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inapplicable. Some such conflict is inevitable if the Tort Claims Act is
to have any meaning and to provide the relief for which Congress
enacted it.
On the other hand, it would be unrealistic to expect the Government
to establish by direct testimony of the employees involved that each act,
omission, or risk was foreseen and knowingly encountered. Not all
governmental policy decisions are made by a single employee or even
an identifiable group of employees. Though the belief may be preva-
lent that every action taken by Government employees is filed and
recorded in quadruplicate as to every detail and minutiae, action in
government, as in other areas, is frequently taken on the basis of
unexpressed assumptions or considerations. In these areas the courts
and the Government must rely on something in the nature of judicial
notice or a defensive res ipsa loquitur. The process would be not unlike
that by which courts decide as questions of law whether on the facts in
evidence contributory negligence bars recovery, or that proximate
causation does not exist and thus hold that negligence in assisting aman
with a package onto a moving train involves no risk to a woman on the
station platform many feet away.7
For example, it should take no direct proof that a discretionary deci-
sion to establish a wildlife sanctuary would involve, either consciously
or by unexpressed assumption, a decision to incur the risk that bird§
will eat the grain of farmers in the area."2 One deciding to conduct a
test of an explosive atomic energy device obviously intends to run the
risk that vibrations caused by the explosion may cause cracks to appear
in buildings at a considerable distance.Y" One deciding where to locate
an airbase for bombers or an ordnance proving ground must intend to
cause that nuisance, annoyance, and damage which is necessary in the
careful operation of either, and there is no need for his testimony to
establish such a proposition.' And it should be on this basis that
theories of absolute liability for engaging in extra-hazardous activities
are held inapplicable in cases such as Dalehite rather than on the basis
of a construction of the word "wrongful" as excluding harm inflicted in
the course of an extra-hazardous activity.'
T1 Compare Palsgraf v. Long ,Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
72 Cf. Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 341
U.S. 939.7s Cf. Bartholomae Corporation v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Calif.
1955).
14 Cf. Barroll v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 441 (D. Md. 1955).
15 Dalehite v. United States, supra, 346 U.S. at 45. See the statement of Chief Judge
Parker in United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied 347 U.S.
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In some cases the burden of proof imposed on the Government should
not be difficult to sustain. For example, it should not be difficult to
establish that a decision not to return to its private owner a coal mine
seized but not operated during a national coal strike was based upon a
consideration of the effect of such a return on the objectives of the
seizure of all the coal mines in the nation."' Though the burden on the
Government in other cases will be heavy, it seems preferable to impose
such a burden rather than deny recovery, for example, to one whose car
was damaged at an agricultural experiment station by the fall of an
exotic tree because he was unable to prove that the tree no longer was
used for experimental purposes but instead had been left there in a
dangerous condition through oversight or neglect.Y
The suggested limitation of the discretionary function exception
finds textual support in the very language in which the exception is
stated. The exception is of claims . . . based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty.. ." The exception is not of claims "arising out of" exercise or
performance-the terminology used in the succeeding subsection, 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (b). If the acts or omissions on which the plaintiff bases
his complaint were not acts specifically directed, or risks knowingly,
deliberately, or necessarily encountered, in the discretionary determi-
nation to perform or ndt to perform the function or duty, his complaint
is not "based upon" the performance or failure to perform such func-
tions and duties. It is, instead, based upon acts or omissions which had
nothing to do with the functions or duties. They were acts or omissions
treated as irrelevant to achievement of the governmental purposes, and
acts or omissions which, he contends, properly performed would have
caused him no injury. The treatment afforded his claim should be the
same as that of a claim based upon the act or omission of an employee
934: "It should be noted that the liability asserted here against the government is not
one arising out of the mere possession of property, but one created by law for the
invasion of personal and property rights. It is clearly within the power of the state
to enact legislation imposing such liability, and it is equally clear that any such invasion
of rights, whether intentional or not, can be made a wrongful act on the part of the
one guilty of the invasion, and is made such by a statute imposing liability therefor.
As said in the A.L.I. Restatement of Torts, p. 16, the word "'tortious,' which means
wrongful, 'is appropriate to describe not only an act which is intended to cause an
invasion of an interest legally protected against intentional invasion, or conduct which
is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of invasion of such an interest, but also
conduct which is carried on at the risk that the actor shall be subject to liability for
harm caused thereby, although no such harm is intended and the harm cannot be
prevented by any precautions or care which it is practicable to require'." 208 F2d
at 293.
76 Cf. Old King Cole Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Iowa 1949).
77 But cf. Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (D. Puerto Rico 1951), cited
with approval by the majority in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. at 37.
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of the Government who fails to exercise due care in the execution of a
statute or regulation. In such a case the claim is not based upon the
statute or regulation, or the policy which they serve, but upon negligent
conduct unrelated to, or not a part of, the statute or regulation. The
express language of statutory exception involved in such cases does not
bar the claim unless the employee was exercising due care." The fact
that it is a part of the same section which contains the discretionary
function exception is certainly support for the construction here sug-
gested. And the legislative history of the section, while far from con-
clusive, suggests that both portions of the section bd construed in the
same manner and in the manner here suggested."
One possible conflict with the statutory language does appear. The
construction proposed would permit the imposition of liability, but only
if local tort principles would sanction such a result, in cases where
through oversight or neglect there was a failure to exercise discretion.
On the other hand the statutory language of the exception excludes
from the coverage of the act claims based upon "the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function.. ." The proposed construction
would in effect insert the word "discretionary" before the word "fail-
ure." Perhaps the awkwardness of the sentence structure with the
insertion is an explanation of its omission; perhaps the word "failure"
was not used with the familiar meaning of common parlance but
in the somewhat forced technical sense of "refusal" sometimes given it
"3 Nor has there been difficulty in finding liability in such cases. Hatahley v. United
States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
TO The paragraph of explanation which accompanied the section in committee reports
on the bills which incorporated the section from the time of its original introduction is
quoted in full, supra, note 10. One sentence of the paragraph reads: "This is a highly
important exception, intended to preclude any possibility that the bill might be construed
to authorize suit for damages against the Government growing out of an authorized
activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project, where no negligence on the part
of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention that
the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious, or that the statute or
regulation was invalid." (emphasis supplied). The committee reports thus join
statutes, regulations and discretionary functions in a single sentence for conunent, and
indicate that with all liability can be imposed if there is a wrongful act other than those
necessary to conduct of an authorized activity. A later sentence in the report does read,
"The bill is not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the validity of or
provide a remedy on account of such discretionary acts even though negligently per-
formed and involving an abtlse of discretion." But, as the word "such" indicates, in
the context of the report, that sentence refers to claims against regulatory agencies
based upon an alleged abuse of discretionary authority, and not to negligence in the
conduct of an activity such as a flood-control or irrigation project. In terms of the
construction here suggested, the distinction is that the acts or omissions of regulatory
agencies of which complaint is made are usually acts deliberately and intentionally
directed, even though the decision to so act or direct might be considered "negligent."
But in the conduct of other government activities there may be negligent acts or
omissions which were not directed by one with authority to do so.
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in legal jargon. More important, as mentioned above,"0 the exception
was added as a clarifying amendment to achieve the results which
probably would have been the product of judicial construction without
such an express statement. In the mandamus cases, where there is an
equally sensitive approach to the relation between the judiciary and
other branches of the Government, the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary act must be a discretionary refusal to preclude issuance of
the writ.81 Such a formula, developed in a context in which sovereign
immunity held a dignified place, certainly should be sufficient to protect
the interests of the Government under a statute waiving that immunity
as well as the purposes of legislators drafting such a statute. Moreover,
as additional confirmation that the construction would achieve the
purposes for which the exception was drafted, it appears that the results
obtained through such a cunstruction of the exception are not unlike
those which the courts probably would have reached through applica-
tion of orthodox principles of tort law.
As lawyers are well aware, the process of determining what is negli-
gent conduct is a process of weighing a variety of factors in determin-
ing upon a desirable social result; the extent of the risk, and the gravity
of the harm which will occur if the risk eventuates are weighed against
the utility of the actor's conduct, the possibilities that the interests for
which the actor acts wil be advanced by his particular course of con-
duct, the alternative courses of conduct available to the actor, and the
expense to the actor and the public of requiring a different course of
conduct." When the courts are called upon to achieve a desirable
social result or a sound public policy it is unlikely that they would sub-
stitute their judgment for that of the legislature in the enactment of a
statute, or, with less certainty, the decision of an authorized adminis-
trative official issuing a regulation or determining upon a course of
conduct he believed necessary to achieve governmental objectives with
respect to which he was given authority and discretion. In such cases
argument as to what is the just social result or sound public policy is
foreclosed by the decisions of the legislature or official that certain
acts, omissions, or risks must be performed or encountered to achieve
the governmental objective. There is no need for the court to weigh
the factors involved; that has already been done by one authorized to
do so. But where the act or omission involved is not one which was
directed, or a risk knowingly, deliberately, or necessarily encountered
80 See note 11, suPra.
81 See cases cited in notes 45 and 46, supra.
82 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 291-293 (1934); PROSSER, TORTS § 30 (2d ed. 1955).
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in the furtherance of the objectives or purposes for which authority
was given, there has been no prior determination or weighing, and the
courts are free to use the ordinary principles of negligence in deter-
mining whether it is a desirable social result or sound public policy to
impose liability for such acts or omissions. I
It may be expected that in a number of cases there would -be diffi-
culty under the proposed construction in determining whether a plain-
tiff's injuries were caused by acts or omissions which were discretionary
within the meaning suggested or whether they were caused by non-
discretionary acts or omissions. The problem would be particularly
acute where it appeared that the injuries inflicted, or at least a portion
of them, would have been caused by the discretionary acts and omis-
sions. However, problems of proof of causation and apportionment of
damages are not new to courts, and even problems of joint or concur-
rent causation have accepted formulas for solution. Where the defend-
ant's negligently-caused forest fire joined with another forest fire of
unknown origin and caused harm to the plaintiff, one court held in a
well-known case that the defendant, to establish a defense, must show
that (a) the other fire was innocently caused and (b) that it would by
itself have caused the harm of which the plaintiff complained." Section
432 6f the Restatement of Torts goes further and provides that a jury
may impose liability for the negligent or culpable cause even though
the innocent cause would also have produced the same harm." Cases
considering the problem of liability where both the innocent cause and
the culpable cause proceed from the same party are infrequent, but, at
least where the injury is indivisible, it would seem unjust to deny lia-
bility." These principles may be applied to cases arising under the
Federal Tort Claims Act under the construction proposed. Both the
proposed construction and these principles of tort law would require
the Government to show that each of the acts or omissions of which a
plaintiff complains were innocent-that is, that they were a part of the
discretionary determinations made. Failure to make such proof would
result in liability because the claim would not be based upon the inno-
cent, discretionary acts or omissions, but upon culpable acts or omis-
sions.
s3 Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 191 Wis. 610, 211 N.W. 913 (1927).
8 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 432 (2) (1934) "If two forces are actively operating, one
because of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part,
and each of itself is suficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may
be held by the jury to be a substantial factor in bringing it about." See also, Piossam,
TORTS § 44 (2d ed. 1934).
is See Note, 31 WASHr. L. REv. 177 (1956); See also Peaslee, Multiple Causalion
and Damage, 47 H.Av. L. Rzv. 1127 (1934).
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APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION To
DEcmE CASES
As suggested above, the proposed construction would supply a recon-
ciliation of the leading Supreme Court cases if the Dalehite case is
viewed as one which involved affirmative, discretionary determinations
as to what should be done and what risks should be encountered to
achieve certain governmental objectives. Neither the Indian Towing nor
the Union Trust Company case was susceptible of such a characteriza-
tion, at least in the posture in which the cases came before the Court.
And the more recent case of Hatahley v. United States"' presents no
problem in this respect since the lack of statutory authority for the acts
of the Government employees also established the lack of discretion.
Cases decided by lower courts indicate that those courts have acted in
accordance with the proposed construction in cases where factors, such
as in arbitrary circumstances of time, have made it possible to separate
the discretionary acts from those which did not involve discretion.
Where the discretionary decision to admit dependents of military
personnel or civilians to Government hospitals has been separated by
the time factor from the later negligence in treatment, the courts have
not hesitated to impose liability."' Where the decision to release a
patient from a mental hospital might have been made in the furtherance
of a governmental policy, courts, applying a blanketing type of immu-
nity, have denied liability.8 ' The cases seem inconsistent with the
86 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
8 7 United States v. Gray, 199 F2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Costley v. United States,
181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Grigalauskas v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 543 (D.
Mass. 1951), affd, 195 F.2d 494; Dishman v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 567 (D. Md.
1950). The fact that the appeal taken by the Government in the Grigalauskas case,
supra, was limited to the question of damages may reflect a conclusion by the Depart-
ment of Justice that the discretionary function exception is inapplicable in such cases,
or at least that it is futile to attempt to convince the courts that it is.
88 Smart v. United States, 207 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Kendrick v. United States,
82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949). For contrary results under the New York Court of
Claims Act, see the cases cited in note 10, supra. Cf. Denney v. United States, 171
F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948), affirming a judgment for the Government entered on a motion
to dismiss and holding the exception applicable to a claim for the death of a child
allegedly caused by the negligence of the government in failing to furnish necessary
hospital and medical services at the time of the birth of the child. It appears from
the separate opifiion of Judge Sibley, who concurred on the ground that Texas law did
not permit recovery on such a cause of action, that the plaintiff offered to prove that
officials at the army hospital gave assurances that the child would be cared for, that
they had attended the expectant mother and given her medical aid prior to the date of
birth, and that on that date when requested to take her to the hospital they advised
that an ambulance was on the way. In the Costley case, supra, note 83, a different panel
of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit distinguished the Denney case on the basis
that Mrs. Costley had been admitted to the hospital whereas Mrs. Denney had not,
saying that in the Denney case there was no liability because hospital or ambulance
facilities were not available or medical attendance was not practicable. The distinction
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admission cases and they leave a suspicion of doubt or dissatisfaction
because the proof of discretion was not certain. The governmental
policy might just as well have been served by further retention and
treatment and the decision to release made solely on the basis of an
unreasonable mistake as to the condition of the patient." Where a
time factor made it possible to separate an assumed discretionary
decision to mark or not to mark a wreck from negligence in the manner
in which the marking buoy was set up and maintained, liability was
imposed.' Likewise, where an assumed discretion as to the manner of
constructing irrigation canals was separated by time from alleged negli-
gence in maintenance of the canals liability, could be found. 1 It was
clear that the failure to place lights at night at the dams in a Govern-
ment-maintained system of locks played no necessary part in the dis-
cretionary decision to establish and operate the locks where lights had
been so placed for a long period of time and the rules established by
the officer in charge required that lights be set out where the locks were
left unattended in darkness.". A possibly discretionary decision as to
what witnesses should e questioned in the course of an army investiga-
tion is separable from decisions as to the manner of questioning or
grilling witnesses." Where an assumed discretion to explode an atomic
energy device,"' set up coyote traps,"5 a road block," or not to "dedud"
is obviously fallacious. In the Denney case the plaintiff was not permitted to prove the
contrary of those facts. (The burden of proof should, of course, have been on the
Government to establish its defense.) The ordinary principles of tort law would impose
no liability for failure to render service gratuitously to army dependents, but would
impose liability for the termination of the services if they left the person aided in a
worse position than he was when the services were begun. RESTATEIMExT, ToRTS § 323
(1934). Liability would likewise be imposed if army officials, by their gratuitous under-
taking, had led the dependents to refrain from taking necessary steps to obtain aid from
then available protective action by third persons. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 325 (1934).
"9 The fact that regulations governing the procedures for discharging patients may
have been followed should not be conclusive, if the employees of the Government failed
to exercise due care while following the procedures. In such a case the claim is not
based upon the procedure established, but upon the negligent failure of employees to
observe that the condition of the patient was not such as to make those procedures
appropriate. Moreover, the pertinent regulations may consist of no more than a check
list of things to be done in the course of releasing a patient, similar to operating
manuals distributed by large private businesses, and unrelated to the policies or
objectives of the Government in furnishing such medical assistance. Cf. Carr Y. United
States, 136 F. Supp. 527, at 534 (E.D. Va. 1955).
o Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951).
91 Desert Beach Corporation v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 581 (S.D. Calif. 1955).
92 Bevilacqua v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 493 (W.D.Pa. 1954).
"3 Hambleton v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Wash. 1949), rev'd on other
grounds, 185 F.2d 564.
"Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955).
"5Worley v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 719 (D. Ore. 1952).
96 Hernandez v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 369 (D. Hawii 1953).
'7 United States v. White, 211 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1954).
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a target range, 7 was obviously separable from the negligent failure to
give warnings, liability could also be found.
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
furnishes another interesting example.' The plaintiff was injured when
his team of horses was frightened by a two-engined Beechcraft airplane
of the Civil Aeronautics Administration which flew overhead not more
than one hundred feet off the ground. The plane was engaged in making
a survey for the purpose of establishing an instrument approach pattern
for a neighboring airport. The trial court found from the evidence that
it was the decision and judgment of the CAA that the most efficient and
expedient method of obtaining the necessary data was by visual check
from a low flying airplane traveling at the approximate height of the
highest known obstruction in the area. It also appeared that the
administration had decided that two-engined airplanes, rather than
single-engined planes, were necessary for such operations.
The court of appeals reversed a judgment for the United States and
remanded the case for further findings. It held that the discretionary
function exception did not apply if the pilots of the plane failed to take
reasonable care and precaution in their flight to avoid injury to persons
in the position of the plaintiff. The court of appeals did not base its
conclusion that there might be liability on the facts that the survey was
made with a low-flying plane rather than from the ground or with a two-
engine plane rather than a single-engine plane. The evidence had estab-
lished that those with authority to do so had decided that the govern-
mental purposes of establishing the instrument approach pattern made
necessary the use of those techniques. (Using the construction of the
exception here suggested, the trespasses, annoyances, and risks inherent
in their use would thus be within the exception.) But failure to keep a
lookout for persons in the position of the plaintiff and to use care to
avoid harm to them if possible would be a basis for imposing liability
because they formed no part of the discretionary function, either by
design or by necessity.
An analogous case' involved a decision that preservation of a wildlife
refuge made it necessary to ipray with herbicide a dense growth of
willows which were destroying vegetation necessary for food supply and
preventing normal control of malarial mosquitoes. Though, as found by
the trial court, the actual spraying work was done in a reasonable,
prudent manner, some of the herbicide drifted onto and destroyed plain-
98 Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956).9 9Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953).
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tiff's cotton. The decision to use a herbicide was not an unthinking
choice of the easiest available means; other methods had been tried
without success, and unless the willows were removed the purposes of
a wildlife refuge and malarial control would, it was believed, have been
defeated. °0 The court accordingly was correct in holding the discretion-
ary function exception applicable, there having been no showing of acts
or omissions on which liability could be predicated other than those
deliberately performed with appreciation of the risks involved to
achieve the governmental purpose.
Where the plaintiff complained only of injuries which he suffered
when the Government changed the course ,of the Missouri River for
purposes of transportation, but alleged no negligence in the details of
the work done, the complaint was held to be barred by the discretionary
function exception." 1 As the complaint was framed, the only acts and
omissions on which he based his claim were those which were neces-
sarily a part of the discretionary decision to improve water transporta-
tion on that portion of the river. In another case,"' the plaintiff's com-
plaint was that his property had been damaged by the use of excessively
heavy charges of dynamite in deepening the channel of the Mississippi.
The action was dismissed upon a showing that the specifications for the
work, including the size of the dynamite charges, were prepared in a
local headquarters office and approved by the Chief of Engineers in
Washington. Such proof falls below that which it is suggested here be
required to establish a defense. No reason appears why the deepening
of the channel could not have been accomplished with smaller charges;
there is no indication that the use of smaller charges would have been
10 Not all of these facts appear in the findings of the trial court, which made only
conclusionary finding that, "The decision to use the herbicide 2-4-D as a means to
destroy the willows was made, both in the case of the Corps of Engineers and in the
case of the Fish and Wildlife Service, by persons having the authority to do so, and in
each instance involved the use of discretion as distinguished from a routine or
ministerial act." 106 F. Supp. at 299. But the brief for the Government on appeal,
at pp. 11-12, 18-19, makes it apparent that the evidence on which this finding "as
based was as summarized above.101 Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
102Boyce v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950). The decision was
cited with approval by the majority in the Dalehite case as being of like import
with the Coates decision, supra, note 97. 346 U.S. at 36-37. The cases are distinguish-
able on the basis suggested above. If use of the excessively large charges was merely
the result of an oversight as opposed to a discretionary determination that they were
necessary to obtain an improved navigational system denial of liability would be in
direct conflict with the purpose of the exception stated fn the committee reports, .-upra,
note 10. "This... exception [is] intended to preclude any possibility that the bill
might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government growing
out of an authorized activity ... where no negligence on the part of any Government
3gent ir shown, and the only ground for suit is that the same conduct by a private
individual would be tortious..." (emphasis supplied.)
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more expensive or that the governmental purpose of an improved
navigational system depended upon the cost of the project being held
within certain budgetary limits set by Congress. Approval of the
specifications with the large charges could just as well have resulted
from neglect or oversight as from a determination that such charges
had to be used if the governmental purpose was to be accomplished.
Later decisions under the act have not utilized such a blanketing or
peremptory application of the exception. Thus, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, reversing a judgment against the United States
for property damage done when an irrigation canal broke, held the
discretionary function exception applicable to the alleged negligence of
the Government in failing to line the entire canal with concrete.'"' But
it did so, relying on testimony that the feasibility of the irrigation
project depended upon its cost and that lining the entire canal system
with concrete would have rendered the project unfeasible.'" Since
there was a failure of proof of negligence in any other respects, such as
inspection of the canals, or the failure to line the particular portion of
the canal in which the break occurred as opposed to other places where
the canal was so lined, the complaint was based upon an omission
deliberately determined upon as essential to the performance of the
discretionary function of establishing the irrigation system.'0 ' As such,
it was properly held to be barred by the discretionary function excep-
tion.
- In another case' the plaintiff sought to recover for damage to its
construction site caused when an upstream cofferdam constructed for
the Government collapsed. The court denied the Government's motion
for summary judgment because of the absence of proof as to whether
the pertinent decisions regarding the planning and construction of the
cofferdams were made by the Government in the exercise of executive
and legislative discretion in authorizing the entire project or as a mere
job of work incidental to the discretionary decision to construct the
whole project. In action for damages to and loss of profits of plaintiff's
business of raising small fish, turtles, and aquatic plants allegedly
caused by the changes made in the contours of upstream lands during
the construction of an air base the court denied a motion to dismiss,
indicating that recovery might be had if the facts showed that the
lo United States v. Ure, 225 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955).
104 225 F.2d at 712-713.
"Of 225 F.2d at 712.
106 Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp, 126 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Calif.
1954).
[Au umx
1956] FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS-DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 237
plaintiff complained of acts or omissions other than the discretionary
determination to build the airbase."' Another court denied a motion to
dismiss where the complaint showed that it was based upon the diver-
sion of water in excess of that given by decree to the predecessors in
interest of the United States, possibly for use by the Government as
owner of land, and not necessarily upon a discretionary determination
to construct a weir or dam as a part of a public work or project.' In
another case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
judgment for the Government, but based its decision on the failure of
the plaintiff to establish negligence, and not upon blanket immunity
which the trial court gave to all flights of planes from an air base at
which experimental work was done."'
In cases of this sort the fact that a high ranking officer or employee
directed the particular act or omission on which the complaint is based
should not be of controlling importance. It should not be by the office
of the person, but by the nature of the thing done that the applicability
of the discretionary function exception is determined.'" Negligent
oversight as to matters having no relationship to achievement of gov-
ernmental objectives is possible in higher echelons of government as
well as in the lower levels; indeed, they frequently may be no more than
a failure to discover and correct errors negligently made by lower level
employees. But if the acts or omissions were specifically directed, or
risks knowingly, deliberately, or necessarily encountered for the ad-
vancement of a governmental objective, they are so enmeshed with the
discretionary decision to pursue that objective that they cannot be
made the basis of a tort action without putting in question the desira-
bility of that objective.
Application of the suggested construction of the discretionary func-
tion exception to decided cases indicates that liability would not be
imposed in every case in which the act or omission was not directed as
one necessary or desirable for achievement of the governmental objec-
tive. Liability must be found under local tort law. And ordinary rules
of tort law would preclude imposition of liability in many cases con-
sidered by some courts to be within the exception. For example, many
of the duties imposed by statute on government employees are duties
which run only to the Government itself, and have no effect on private
107 Smith v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 131 (D. Dela. 1953).1o8E!Iison v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 18 (D. Nev. 1951).
109 Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955).
110 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, supra, notes 42 and 43.
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rights.11' Construction of statutes which create no private rights or
liabilities is certainly not a problem restricted to governmental
liability.11"2
In the Dalehite case the majority held, and the dissenters did not
appear to deny, that there could be no liability on the part of the Gov-
ernment for the alleged failure of the Coast Guard in fighting the fire at
Texas City. The majority cited in support of its decision Steitz v. City
of Beacon."' That decision, as well as Mock v. Rensselaer Water
Co.,"' on which it relied, turned largely upon familiar tort questions of
to whom duties had been created by the city charter and the contract
involved. It may well be that upon a proper construction the statutes
requiring the weather bureau to make flood forecasts create a duty
running only to the Government so that inaction alone would not cre-
ate liability."5 A statute requiring the Geological Survey to prepare
estimates of the provable oil reserves on Government lands may well-
create only duties to the Government," and statutory provisions gov-
erning the approval of FHA loans may create no duties to future ten-
ants of the apartments whose owners obtain such a loan. 1" Audit duties
imposed by statute may likewise involve no duties to private parties."
The duties imposed by statute on the Coast Guard to provide for the
safety of navigation or conduct rescue operations may, at least insofar
as a case involves only failure to take affirmative action, be duties which
run only to the government and do not create private rights,"' and the
duty imposed on the Corps of Engineers to take action in times of
flood may be, at least with respect to their failures to act, a duty owed
only to the Government itself.'20 The same may be true with respect
to some of the duties imposed by regulations on control tower operators
at'airports. = But where the statutory duty which the Government
fails to perform is one which imposes liability on private parties who
111 Cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co, 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
112 See RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 288 (1934).
"'s 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E2d 704 (1945).
114 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
15 Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mo. 1953),
aff'd sub noma. National Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 210 Fed. 263 (8th Cir.
1955), cert. denied 347 U.S. 967.
116 Jones v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 894 (W.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd 207 F2d 563,
cert. denied 347 U.S. 921.
'IT Choy v. Farragut Gardens, 131 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
118 Social Security Admin. F.C.U. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md.
1956).
29See Justice Frankfurter's statement in Indian Towing Company v. United States,
supra, note 32: "The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service." 350 U.S.
at 69. Cf. Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219 CD. Mass. 1951).
12 0 Clark v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 213 (D. Ore. 1952), aff'd 218 F.2d 446.
122 Smerdon v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1955).
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similarly fail to perform the duty imposed, liability should be
imposed. 2
Those cases construing statutes as creating no private rights or lia-
bilities frequently represent the unsuccessful attempt to supply a duty
to act-to make nonfeasance where there is no misfeasance a basis for
imposing liability. Though the distinction between nonfeasance and
misfeasance may find its basis more in the history of the common'law
forms of action than in reason, logic, or justice, it is, with its some-
times arbitrary, artificial, and unsatisfactory results, a part of our tort
law."" The familiar area is that of the rescuer or "good Samaritan".
And in this area, cases arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act
appear to have accepted the general prevailing rule that while there is
no duty to go to the rescue of one in peril not caused by the actor,'
,there is a duty to use due care not to injure the rescued person or not
to leave him in a worse position than he was found.' Of course, one
may leave those he intended to aid by his good Samaritan acts in a
worse position by creating a situation dangerously misleading to the
intended beneficiaries.'
If the duties to act imposed by particular statutes and regulations
are duties running only to the Government there would be no liability
under familiar tort principles for a failure to act. But if the Govern-
ment acts, it acts as a good Samaritan with respect to beneficiaries. In
such cases, if the discretionary function exception is inapplicable, the
Government will be liable on good Samaritan principles for the harm
wrongfully inflicted when that duty is undertaken and negligently per-
formed.
CONCLUSION
The discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act
has caused considerable confusion and a very substantial amount of
litigation. It may well rank highest as the "clarifying" amendment
which did most to obscure the purposes of a statute. If the courts
would treat the exception only as the reminder it was apparently in-
- Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cfr. 1951). See e.g.,
The Mary S. Lewis, 126 F. 848 (D.C. Conn, 1903).
728 Bohlen, Moral Dty to Aid Others as the Ba.is of Tort Liability 56 U. oP PA.
L. REv. 217, 316 (1908) ; Ames, Law and Moral, 22 HAtv. L. REv. 97 (1908). See
RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 314 et seq. (1934).
124 Lacey v. United States, supra, note 119.
125 United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (Sth Cir. 1955).
1"6 Cf. Indian Towing Company v. United States, supra, note 32. Cf. also Foley v.
State, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945).
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tended to be, the results would be more just and the purposes of the
act better served.
The analogies of mandamus actions and private damage suits against
public officers, analyzed in light of their reasons, and the ordinary prin-
ciples of tort law furnish a satisfactory construction for the exception.
Liability cannot be imposed when condemnation of the acts or omis-
sions relied upon necessarily brings into question the propriety of
governmental objectives or .programs or the decision of one who, with
the authority to do so, determined that the acts or omissions involved
should occur or that the risk which eventuated should be encountered
for the advancement of governmental objectives. But if the acts or
omissions were not directed or necessarily a consequence of what was
directed they form no part of the discretionary determination. Imposi-
tion of liability in such a case does not involve a questioning of the
propriety of the discretionary action.
Allowing the defense on the basis suggested will, of course, result in
the rejection of many claims which appear to be meritorious. The
objection would appear to run however, not to the construction given
the exception, but to adoption of a statute which limits compensation
to those claims sustainable on tort principles developed in suits between
private parties. Orthodox tort principles reach their limits as a system
of compensation at that point where the award calls into question and
condemns a public policy decided upon by one who had the authority to
do so. If the constitutional provisions for just compensation included
just compensation for "damage" for public use as well as for "taking"
for public use, as do the constitutions of a number of states, the gap in
the system of compensation for the burdens of federal activity would
be considerably narrower.""7 But tort principles supply no basis for
distinguishing between the annoyance and inconvenience necessarily
caused to residents near a jet air base established for our national
defense and the harm caused, for example, to a manufacturer of cos-
metics or jewelry through the imposition of a luxury tax to meet the
financial burdens of national defense. They justify an award to neither.
Of course, holding the exception applicable on the basis suggested,
also opens the possibility that recoveries will be denied if Government
employees under pressure from superiors or from faulty memories
testify that the acts or omissions were considered and deemed necessary
or desirable for achievement of the governmental purpose. Faulty
127 See Harris v. United States, 205 F2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953) ; North v. United
States, 94 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1950).
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memories present no novel problems for courts, and much of our system
of justice necessarily operates on the assumption that witnesses will
tell the truth. Moreover there is less reason for an official to falsify his
testimony in an action which would not result in a judgment against
him personally than in cases between private parties where such is the
result. Indeed, in many cases it would seem to be the much wiser course
for an employee interested in promoting his personal career to admit a
negligent oversight than to assert poor judgment in determining that
the acts or omissions involved were necessary or desirable for the
achievement of the governmental objective. Moreover, an assertion
that the acts or omissions involved in many cases were considered to be
necessary or desirable for the achievement of the governmental objec-
tives would strain credulity and certainly require more proof than the
assertion alone."' 8
One other area remains where claims will be denied--caims for the
advantages which would have been conferred on citizens by a better
administration of government. Where Government employees are lax
iq performance of those duties which run only to the Government, but
do not affirmatively injure or make worse the position of the plaintiff,
claims for the advantages which would have accrued through a better
administration must be denied. Enactment of the Federal Tort Claims
Act will thus give greater emphasis to the undesirable distinction drawn
in tort law between misfeasance and nonfeasance. However, there is
nothing in the Federal Tort Claims Act which suggests that duties to act
should be imposed on the Government where they would not be imposed
in suits between private parties or that tort actions against the Govern-
ment were provided as an alternative means of getting a high level of
good government which previously was obtainable only through the
ballot box.'e
The purpose of this article has not been to suggest a scheme which
will equitably distribute all of the burdens and costs of government.
128 Cf. Worley v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 719 (D. Ore. 1952) (failure to post
signs warning of the presence of traps known as coyote getters) ; Bulloch v. United
States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955) (failure to give warning of impending
explosion of atomic device) ; Carr v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Va. 1955)
(recovering all crashed airplane by conducting extensive dredging operations on oyster
beds for twenty and one half hours) ; Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th
Cir. 1956) (failing to keep a lookout for persons on the ground while conducting an
aerial survey from a low level).
129 This is not to say that such a system could not be devised as a supplement to
the ballot box. French courts have apparently developed such a system of principles.
See Schwartz, Public Tort Liability in Fratce, 29 N.Y.U. LAw Rav. 1432 (1954);
Jacoby, Federal Tort Claims Act and French Law of Governmental Liability: A Com-
parative Study, 7 VAND. L. Ra,. 246 (1954) ; Smaar, GovERtNmENTAL LLAn=ry, at
56-80 (1953).
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Its scope has been much more limited. The purpose has been only that
of suggesting a proper construction for a troublesome and very impor-
tant exception of the existing Federal Tort Claims Act. Perhaps, how-
ever, when what has been accomplished by existing legislation has been
made clear, determination of what additional legislation is necessary
will also be more apparent.
